The 2006 dissolution of PwC ChuoAoyama significantly changed market share composition of Japanese audit firms which marked the transition from Big 4 period to Big 3 period. This study aims to investigate audit market pricing competitiveness between Big N and non-Big N auditors using a sample of Japanese firms listed in the First Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange during the transition from Big 4 period (2004)(2005) to Big 3 period (2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010)(2011). This paper analyzes audit market pricing competitiveness between Big N and non-Big N auditors by employing panel fixed effects multivariate regression with audit fee as the dependent variable and interaction between audit fee premium and client segment size as variable of interest while controlling for other variables affecting audit fee. The empirical results indicate a non-competitive audit pricing market between Big N and non-Big N auditors where Big N auditors earn increasingly higher audit fee as client segment size becomes larger.
Introduction
In April 2005, one client of ChuoAoyama-the PwC affiliated audit firm in Japan-committed the then largest accounting fraud in Japan [1] . In an effort to restore its reputation, PwC splits ChuoAoyama into two firms in A number of influential regulators and organizations have expressed concern over the adverse effect on audit market competition in an event of a hypothetical scenario if one of the Big 4 auditors experienced an unexpected market exit [3] [4] [5] [6] . A highly concentrated audit market has a high systemic risk and the collapse of a dominant firm could disrupt the whole audit market [7] . OECD warns regulators that there is a risk that another significant event could dismantle another Big N firms and raise concentration in the audit market [8] . The loss of another large firm would further reduce large companies' auditor choice and negatively affect audit fee competitiveness [9] .
Adverse effects of a highly concentrated audit market where a few large auditors have large market power include: limited incentives for auditors to innovate and provide superior audit quality, large audit firms become too-big-to-fail rendering audit regulations to be ineffective and higher audit prices without corresponding increase in audit quality [10] [11] [12] . U.S., U.K. & European regulators expressed their concern that the market dominance of Big 4 firms might adversely affect audit quality due to lack of competition [13] . The lack of market competition might also motivate audit regulators to overregulate audit market as a justification to artificially promote competition [14] .
Following the market exit of both PwC Misuzu and ChuoAoyama, Japanese Big N audit market has a much higher market share concentration (over 90% market share) for the large public firms' market segment compared to other developed economies, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Thus, the question of whether audit market pricing competitiveness is affected during the audit market transition increased by 21 .42% in the same period (based on author's calculation). In addition, prior empirical research investigating predictors of audit quality in Japan find that auditor size is not associated with audit quality [15] [16] [17] . The lack of association between audit quality and auditor size reduces the capacity for Japanese large auditors to differentiate their audit service using high quality audit. Prior study on the Japanese investors' market reaction shows that the reputations of large auditors affiliated with Olympus were not affected by the publication of negative news surrounding the revelation of the Olympus fraud [18] ; indicating that Japanese investors have a low audit quality expectation for large auditors. The combination of the declining Big N firms market share, the rising non-Big N auditors' market share, weaker audit service differentiation of large auditors, and low audit quality expectation for large auditors contribute to greater likelihood for Japanese Big N and non-Big N auditors to compete for clients. Those factors motivate this study to examine audit pricing competitiveness between Big N and non-Big N auditors in Japan.
Audit market pricing competitiveness between large (Big N) and small (non-Big N) audit firms is inferred as a function of Big N fee premium and audit clients' segment size on audit fee. Big N audit fee premium is defined as additional audit fee paid by clients of one of the Big N firms that the clients otherwise would not pay to non-Big N auditors [19] . The audit market for small size clients represents a yardstick for a price-competitive audit market because the demands for audit service from a large number of small clients has low barrier to entry that can be provided by a large number of auditors. Audit market pricing between Big N and non-Big N auditors is competitive when Big N auditors differentiate their service to justify the Big N fee premium in both large and small client segments [19] [20] . Thus, audit market competitiveness between Big N Frendy DOI: 10.4236/ojacct.2018. 71004 45 Open Journal of Accounting and non-Big N auditors can be inferred from the differential Big N audit fee premium between large and small client market segments [19] [20] [21] .
The estimation results of the multivariate panel fixed effect regression models indicate a non-competitively priced audit market between Big N and non-Big N auditors as Big N firms receive a disproportionally higher audit fee premium as the client size increases. In addition, this study investigates whether the Big N audit fee premium is differentially affected by the transition from Big 4 period (2004 Big 4 period ( -2006 to Big 3 period (2007 Big 3 period ( -2011 following the demise of PwC ChuoAoyama that significantly changed the Japanese audit market structure (refer to Figure 2 ). Chen et al. (2007) argue that the audit fee premium could provide a measure of market power or competition in a market where the dynamics of audit supply and demand have not reached equilibrium in a short run [22] , like during the transition from Big 4 to Big 3 period. The difference-in-difference analysis results
show that the transition from Big 4 to Big 3 period contributes to a less competitive audit pricing between Big N and non-Big N auditors. Prior empirical study in Japan has shown that Japanese listed firms are concerned with the good reputation of their auditors [1] . Thus, the higher reputation and brand recognition of Japanese Big N firms can be leveraged to negotiate higher audit fees with their clients, which contribute to the non-competitive audit pricing between Big N and non-Big N auditors.
A number of sensitivity analyses (auditor self-selection control, year-by-year analysis and reduced sample analysis) are performed to ensure the robustness of the audit fee regression models. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no empirical research investigating audit pricing competitiveness between Big N and non-Big N firms during the transition from Big 4 period to Big 3 period in Japan. This paper presents important empirical evidence for the Japanese and international accounting standard setters and regulators to consider when discussing the potential implication future policies regarding regulation or deregulation of competition in the audit market. Although market competition regulators have passed mergers proposal of large auditors in the past; regulators should carefully consider the adverse effects of future merger proposals or potential demise of existing Big N auditors on audit market competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, prior literatures on international and Japanese audit market structure, market competition, and audit fee premium are discussed. Section 3 develops hypotheses related to audit pricing competition between Big N and Non-Big N Auditors and audit pricing competition among individual firms at the industry level. Section 4 discusses audit fee regression models related to the hypotheses, control variables, industry level audit market concentration measures, and sample selection process. In Section 5, descriptive statistics and estimation results of the multivariate panel fixed effect regressions models related to the hypotheses are evaluated. Section 6 presents the results of the sensitivity analyses and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Audit Market Pricing Competitiveness: Big N Audit Fee Premium and Audit Fee
Audit service market for public companies has three characteristics that differentiate it from other professional services market: capital market transparency, mandated demand, and concentrated supply [3] . Unlike other professional service industries, audit services are artificially mandated by government regulations which are subsequently subjected to the supply and demand forces of the market [23] . Audit services is considered as differentiated service market due to the following factors: publicly listed firms can choose among several providers of audit services, audit service is not perfect substitutes and audit firms differentiate each other in terms such as technology, training, culture, management structure, and international networks. Audit clients are informed buyers of the professional service market and they consider how the attributes of each audit firm can provide them with the best net value for a given audit fee [3] . Thus, auditors in differentiated audit service market can earn fee premium if their clients are willing to pay higher fee that the clients otherwise would not pay to other auditors.
Auditors that have established brands and large scale of operation such as Big N firms are more likely to charge higher audit fee and enjoy positive audit fee premium over non-Big N auditors. Big N audit fee premium is defined as additional audit fee paid by clients of one of the Big N firms that the clients otherwise would not pay to non-Big N auditors [19] . In a competitive audit market, auditors with superior service differentiation systematically charge higher fee for all their clients irrespective of their clients' size [24] . Audit market is competitive when Big N auditors differentiate their service to justify their fee premium in both large and small client segments [20] . On the other hand, audit market is not competitive when Big N firms charge higher fees in the large client market relative to smaller market segment [19] . In a seminal paper on audit market competition, Simunic (1980) examines audit fee premium for small and large clients segments and finds no overall premium for either group, consistent with the price competitive market and product differentiation hypothesis [21] . Simunic finds evidence of competitive Big N audit market when audit fee of Big N auditors is lower than audit fee charged by non-Big N firms. Overall, prior empirical and theoretical research investigating audit market competition in the wake of prior Big N mergers and market exit has produced mixed results. and large companies and audit services for small and medium-sized companies [27] . Large audit firms have more incentives to attract large clients segment due to the higher fixed costs and audit planning costs compared to smaller audit firms [28] . Big N auditors also invest more in technology, staff training and support facilities [29] ; which allow them to perform more efficient audit for larger and more complex clients. Large clients market segment, such as multina- Yoshida (2008) argues that audit quality measured by discretionary accruals is not strongly associated with auditors' size in Japan due to low litigation risk and inadequate internal control of the Big N auditors [17] . Yamaguchi (2013) employ propensity score matching method and conclude that audit firm size is not associated with the accuracy of analyst forecasts [16] . A more comprehensive study on audit quality predictors in Japan also concludes that auditor size is not associated with audit quality [15] .
Japanese Audit Market Transition from Big 4 to Big 3 Period
The lack of association between audit quality and auditor size reduces the capacity for Japanese large auditors to differentiate their audit service using high quality audit. Prior study on the Japanese investors' market reaction shows that the reputations of large auditors affiliated with Olympus were not affected by the publication of negative news surrounding the revelation of the Olympus fraud [18] ; suggesting that Japanese investors have a low audit quality expectation for large auditors. The combination of the declining Big N firms market share, the rising non-Big N auditors' market share, weaker audit service differentiation of Empirical evidence on the state of competition in the audit market can be further inferred from the difference in the "average cost residuals" or audit fee premium between Big N and non-Big N for both small and large client market segment [21] . Big N audit fee premium is defined as additional audit fee paid by clients of one of the Big N firms that the clients otherwise would not pay to non-Big N auditors [19] . Simunic's audit pricing model assumes that all auditors -irrespective of their size-engage in competitive pricing in the small client market segment. The audit market for small size clients represents a yardstick for a price-competitive audit market because the demands for audit service from a large number of small clients has low barrier to entry that can be provided by a large number of auditors. Consequently, audit market competitiveness between Big N and non-Big N auditors can be inferred from the differential Big N audit fee premium between large and small clients' market segments [19] [20] [21] .
When client segment size is taken into consideration, pricing between Big N and non-Big N auditors is regarded to be competitive if Big N firms earn consistent fee premium through audit service differentiation that does not vary with the size of clients [19] . However, audit pricing between Big N and non-Big N auditors is considered to be not competitive if Big N auditors earn higher fee premium in the large clients segment compared to the fee premium earned in the small clients segment. In other words, an increasing audit pricing gap between Big N and non-Big N auditors (Big N fee premium) as the client size increases indicates a non-competitive audit pricing between Big N and non-Big N auditors.
Thus, the argument for a non-competitive audit market between Big N and non-Big N auditors can be expressed in the following alternative H1: H1: Audit fee is positively associated with the interaction variable between Big N fee premium and client segment size, other things being equal. provided by Big N auditors and whether higher audit fees can be justified with higher quality audits [22] . By controlling audit fee quality in the audit fee regression model, audit fee premium provides a measure of auditor's market power.
Audit Market Pricing Competition between
Audit fee is a function of audit unit price multiplied by the quantity of audit services, thus an audit fee model that explain audit competition should control for the determinants of audit quantity and price [21] . The modified Simunic's (1980) audit pricing log-level regression model is employed where large auditors' fee premium is proxied by the FeePrem dummy variable 2 [21] . The FeePrem variable of interest is then regressed on the natural log of audit fees (AF variable) while controlling for other audit fee determinants [19] . Year and industry dummy variables are employed so that the regression estimates results are less likely to be affected by contemporaneous changes in regulatory measures and other omitted time and industry level variables that affect audit pricing [33] . The following panel fixed-effect ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is estimated after correcting for heteroscedastic standard errors (regression control variables are defined in Table 1 ): 
where:
, i t AF = natural log of total audit fee paid by client i at time t, which consists 
Audit Market Pricing Competition between Big N & Non-Big N Auditors Following the Transition from Big 4 to Big 3 Period: Difference-in-Difference Analysis
The pre and post treatment approach is a subset of difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis commonly used in empirical research to estimate the effects of certain policy interventions and policy changes that affect the population groups in a different way [34] . Thus, we identify the treatment and control group for both the post and pre-treatment period to estimate whether the transition from Big 4 to Big 3 period affects Big N and non-Big N audit pricing competitiveness that is inferred by the association between Big N audit fee premium and audit fee. between FeePrem and Big3Per (α 4 coefficient) in the following Equation (2) captures how the association between audit fee and Big N fee premium is differentially affected by the audit market transition from Big 4 to Big 3 period. We modify prior Equation (1) by replacing the ClientSeg interaction variable with the treatment period dummy variable (Big3Per) to estimate the difference-in-difference coefficient (α 4 coefficient), as shown in the following Equation 2 (variables are defined in Table 1 ): 
, i t AF = natural log of total audit fee paid by client i at time t, which consists of fee paid to the client's external auditor for financial statement audit of parent company and consolidated subsidiaries. 
Audit Fee Determinants and Control Variables
Consistent with prior audit fee studies; client's attributes (client size, business complexity, risk, and accounting standards), auditor's attributes (audit staff number, audit tenure period, non-audit fee and industry specialization), and audit engagement's attributes (audit opinion, audit quality, client's bargaining power, auditor industry dominance, competitor distance, and exogenous events) are controlled in the audit fee regression models [2] [20] [21] .
The following client's attributes variables are controlled: client size, business complexity, risk, and accounting standards. Client size effect explains most of the variation in audit fees between clients [20] [21] . This paper calculates the client size effect using natural log of the client's total assets (TA variable). Relative audit market size can also moderate the relationship between market concentration and audit pricing. Thus, the client's relative size to its industry is measured using the ratio of the client's total assets to total assets of companies GAAP or IFRS-based financial statements. Thus, the GAAP dummy variable is employed, where it has a value of one if an auditee is a SEC registrant or an IFRS adopter, and zero otherwise.
The following auditor's attributes determinants on audit fee are controlled: audit staff number, audit tenure period, non-audit fee and industry specialization. The number of audit staff working on the audit engagement is employed to control for one of the major determinants of audit fee and audit effort. Carson et al. (2014) argue that the observed increase of audit fees in Australian from 2000-2011 might be driven by higher audit effort that is driven by the global financial crisis and more stringent regulations [20] . Following Kim and Fukukawa (2013) , the unique dataset of Japanese firms disclosure information is employed and natural log of number of CPAs, junior accountants and other staffs employed in the audit engagement (excluding engagement partners) is calculated (TEAM variable) [25] . Auditors are expected to experience a learning effect when provide audit service to the same clients for a number of years that reduces cumulative average audit costs [21] . The audit learning effect is captured in the audit fee model by measuring the number of years an auditee has hired its current auditor (TENR variable). The non-audit fee (NAF variable) is measured by the natural log of total non-audit fee paid by the client to its current year auditor. POW variable is associated with the relative client's bargaining power by measuring the relative size of the client's audit fee relative to the sum of the auditor's total audit fee received from all its clients in the industry [36] . Audit clients that have larger reputational capital at risk are willing to pay higher audit fee. POW is calculated as the audit fee paid divided by the sum of total audit fee earned by that particular company's auditor within an industry.
Numan and Willekens (2012) find that audit fee is higher when the industry market share distance to its next closest competitor increases [37] . The variables used in audit fee premium (Equation (1) and Equation (2)) regression models are summarized in Table 1 . Definition, measurement and expected sign of control variables and industry level audit market concentration variables are discussed in more details in the prior sections.
Sample Selection
Japanese companies publicly listed in the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
Frendy Open Journal of Accounting Table 1 . Variables included in the audit fee premium and the audit market concentration regression models.
Description Variable Definition
Dependent variable AF natural log of total audit fee, which consists of fee paid to external auditors for financial statement audit of the parent company and consolidated subsidiaries.
Variables of Interest
Audit Fee Premium Model: Equations ( (1) and (2) 
Client's attributes-size
IndPTA ratio of the client's total assets to total assets of companies within the industry-year.
Client's attributes-complexity SUBS natural log of number of consolidated subsidiaries (if a company has zero subsidiaries, it is re-coded as 1 before taking the natural log).
Client's attributes-complexity FORN ratio of the client's overseas sales to net sales. of The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) [40] . Joint audit is excluded from the sample because each firm has different fee structure and audit engagement process that can confound the audit fee analyses. Observations that have less than ten listed companies within an industry-year group are excluded to control for small sample bias so that the sample size within an industryyear is sufficiently large [41] . The disproportionate market power of Big N firms on smaller industries is controlled by excluding those small sample observations [33] . Firms from banking, insurance, finance, and security industries are excluded to control for the distinct financial reporting and regulatory frameworks of financial firms.
The sample selection process is shown in Table 2 . The initial sample of eight years fiscal period consists of 22,824 firm-year observations, which are then reduced to 16,563 firm-year observations after firms with missing audit fee and regression control variables are excluded. 184 and 164 observations are excluded to control for joint audit and small sample effect, respectively. Lastly, 905
firm-year observations from financial firms are also excluded. The final sample Table 3 shows sample size and audit fee statistics for the sample. The final sample (15,310 firm-years observation) selection process is described in details in which is statistically significant at 5% level (p value = 0.012).
Regression Models Descriptive Statistics and Estimation Results
The highest peak of audit fee in 2007 can be attributed to more stringent accounting and auditing regulations following the amendment of Financial Instruments and Exchange Law and stricter JICPA self-regulations [39] . Audit fee returns to a lower equilibrium as a response from clients' pressure to decrease audit fee after the 2007 audit fee hike [42] . Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of control variables employed in the A client is categorized as small client if the median total assets belong to the lower half (<50 th percentile) of the industry-year sample. Definitions of the independent variables are described in regression analyses over the observation period. The untabulated average mean (median) non-audit fee (NAF) is 2.52 (0) million yen. This figures shows that it is uncommon for auditors of Japanese listed firms to perform non-audit services.
The non-audit services are commonly provided by Big N firms to their large size audit clients. The ratio of non-audit fee to audit fee paid by Japanese listed firms are extremely small (3.17%) when compared to other developed country that has similar audit and legal environment to Japan. In German audit market, the non-audit fee amount to 41.9% of the total fee paid to auditors and is considered to be as important as audit fee [43] .
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Only 250 firm-years (1.63% of total sample which consists of 39 unique companies) employ non-Japanese accounting standards (SEC registrants or IFRS).
The mean (median) audit fee paid by clients who adopt non-Japanese accounting standards (SEC registrants or IFRS) is 1040.63 million yen (530 million yen).
These figures are significantly higher than audit fee paid by clients who follow Japanese GAAP (J-GAAP) with a mean (median) fee of 61.03 million yen (41.8 million yen). The higher audit fee paid by adopters of non-Japanese accounting standards is consistent with prior study [39] . These results can be attributed to company and auditor size, as results from Table 4 show that non-Japanese GAAP adopters are more likely to be large size clients that employ Big N auditors.
To ensure that the multicollinearity problem does not introduce bias the regression results, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the audit fee regression models is calculated. The VIF value of ten is generally considered as rules of thumb to indicate excessive or serious multi-collinearity [44] . Untabulated results show that the VIF of all the independent variables included in Equation (1) are lower than three. These results show that the regression estimates do not have a serious multicollinearity problem. , Big N auditors earn in average 26.46% higher audit fee (α 1 coefficient in Equation (1)).
Audit Market Pricing Competition between Big N and Non-Big N Auditors
The statistically significant negative estimate of ClientSeg variable (α 2 coefficient in Equation (1)) indicate that large clients segment pays in average 8.48% lower audit fee.
The FeePrem interaction variable examine whether the higher audit fee paid to Big N auditors is differentially affected by client market segment (H1). The estimate of interaction variable between FeePrem and ClientSeg (α 4 coefficient in Equation (1)) is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that Big N auditors receive higher fee as client size becomes larger. Hypothesis 1 argues that pricing between Big N and non-Big N auditors is regarded to be competitive if Big N firms earn consistent fee premium through audit service differentiation that does not vary with the size of clients [19] . However, audit pricing between Big N and non-Big N auditors is considered to be not competitive if Big N auditors earn 3 The procedure calculates the percentage effect of the intercept shift on the dependent variable (natural log of audit fees), and is defined as e z − 1, where z is the coefficient estimate of the regression variable (Ferguson, 2003 ). *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The dependent variable is AF (natural log of total audit fee). Definitions of the independent variables are described in Table 1 .
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higher fee premium in the large clients segment compared to the fee premium earned in the small clients segment.
The results of the regression estimate suggests a non-competitive audit pricing market between Big N and non-Big N auditors in which Big N auditors are paid
Frendy Open Journal of Accounting 7.91% higher fee from their large clients pay compared to fee that small clients' paid to their Big N or non-Big N auditors. The results from Table 5 support H1 alternative hypothesis which indicate a non-competitive audit pricing market between Big N and non-Big N auditors where Big N auditors are paid higher audit fee as client size increases, other things equal.
To complement the results of Table 5 , Table 6 presents the estimation results *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The dependent variable is AF (natural log of total audit fee). Definitions of the independent variables are described in Table 1 . Table 6 support the conclusion of Table 5 that there is a non-competitive audit pricing market between Big N and non-Big N auditors.
Audit Market Pricing Competition between Big N and Non Big N Auditors Following the Transition from Big 4 to Big 3 Period
The difference-in-difference (DiD) interaction variable between FeePrem and Big3Per (α 4 coefficient in Equation (2)) is positive and significant at 5%; providing empirical support of a non-competitive audit pricing market between Big N and non-Big N after the audit market transition. Hypothesis 2 argues that audit market becomes less competitively priced if audit fee is positively associated with Big N audit fee premium following the transition from Big 4 to Big 3 period. Using the economic significance measurement approach of [45] , the regression estimate indicates that Big N audit fee premium becomes slightly higher (3.56% higher) in the Big 3 period compared to prior Big 4 period. The results from Table 7 support H2 alternative hypothesis which indicate that the transition from Big 4 to Big 3 period contributes to a less competitively priced audit market between Big N and non-Big N auditors.
To complement the results of Table 7, Table 8 presents the estimation results of the audit market concentration regression model (Equation (1) Table 8 support the conclusion of Table 7 that support H2 alternative hypothesis that the transition from Big 4 to Big 3 period contributes to a less competitively priced audit market between Big N and non-Big N auditors. 
Sensitivity Analyses

Controlling for Auditor Self Selection
To control for auditor selectivity bias inherent in prior audit fee studies, the two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure is employed [46] . The Heckman (1979) *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The dependent variable is AF (natural log of total audit fee). Definitions of the independent variables are described in Table 1 .
Variable of interest relevant for the hypothesis is printed in bold. Open Journal of Accounting *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The dependent variable is AF (natural log of total audit fee). Definitions of the independent variables are described in Table 1 .
procedure assumes that auditor size variable (BigN) is endogenous in the audit fee model where companies are not randomly assigned to audit firms and clients has the choice whether to hire large or small audit firms [47] . The two-stage
Heckman method is conducted in the following two steps [22] . First, the following can effectively differentiate between Big N and non-Big N auditors [22] . Next, the inverse Mills ratio (λ 0i and λ 1i ) is included as an additional control variable in the audit fee premium regression model (Equations ((1) and (2))) correct for the auditor selfselection bias. The coefficient estimates of λ 0i and λ 1i allow the intercept and slope coefficients in the audit fee regression models to vary across Big N and non-Big N auditors [29] . The untabulated re-estimated results of the auditor self-selection regression models are qualitatively similar with the main findings, suggesting that the findings are not biased by auditor self-selection effect.
Other Sensitivity Analyses
Year-by-year analysis of the cross-sectional regression models (Equation (1)) is conducted to rule out the possibility that repeated observations in the cross-sectional regressions have inflated the significance of the coefficients [22] . The untabulated results are qualitatively consistent with prior results shown in Table 5 .
The main regression models (Equation (1) Table 5 (adjusted R-squared = 64.02%), which indicate that the predictive power of the empirical models is significantly less reliable than the full sample when the 2006 fiscal year excluded sample is used. These results indicate that conclusions of the main findings provide the highest explanatory power and the best-fit for audit fee models compared to the reduced sample models.
Discussion of Results and Conclusions
The 2010 European Commission report predicts that the collapse of one of the Big 4 large audit firms could potentially impair the stability of the financial system [28] . The investigation on the structure of the public audit service market can provide evidence to the audit market regulators whether the market need further market regulation to promote competitiveness. Accordingly, the sudden services may become overpriced in the long run [43] . Gerakos and Syverson (2015) model predicts that audit fee could increase indefinitely if current audit market structure persists [3] . However, academics and other stakeholders caution regulators that they should not artificially increase audit market competition through costly regulatory interventions [49] . Instead, regulators and policy makers should increase incentives for non-Big N firms to compete in the audit market, such as: incentive for mid-tier firms to make investments necessary to audit large firms, encourage audit committees to consider larger pool of auditors that match the scope and depth of audit engagement, and prohibit contractual restriction and debt covenant clause that mandate companies to exclusively appoint Big N firms [50] . The EU Commission recommends several measures to increase competition between Big N and non-Big N auditors: joint audit/audit Frendy Open Journal of Accounting consortia, mandatory rotation of auditors and re-tendering, addressing contractual constraint that limit auditor choice, and issue policies that minimize audit market disruption following a demise of a large audit firm [7] . [23] . In addition, this study is not able to obtain information on audit hours spent on individual audit engagement as an additional predictor variable on audit fee. To correctly infer audit market pricing competition, it is also necessary to measure the extent of effective internal audit effort that could effectively replace some external audit procedures and audit pricing calculation [21] . Firms with robust internal control system are valued by auditors and are expected to reduce external auditors' audit hours which lead to lower fees [51] . However, Japanese firms do not publicly disclose internal audit costs in the financial statements.
The absence of accurate audit firms' cost structure, audit hours spent per audit engagement, and internal control efforts limit the explanatory power of audit fee regression models used in this study. Lastly, the external validity of this study might be debatable because the unique characteristics of the Japanese audit market setting makes it difficult to draw strong policy implication that is applicable for other developing countries [52] . A number of potential determinants of less competitive audit pricing between Big N and non-Big N auditors such as client switching, audit partner migration and audit fee lowballing are outside the scope of this study and are subject to future research.
